Abstract-Current Intrusion Detection System (IDS) technology is not suited to be widely deployed inside a Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) environment. Anomaly-and signature-based IDS technologies have developed methods to cover information technology-based networks activity and protocols effectively. Howevetr these IDS technologies do not include the fine protocol granularity required to ensure network security inside an environment with weak protocols lacking authentication and encryption. By implementing a more specific and more intelligent packet inspection mechanism, tailored traffic flow analysis, and unique packet tampering detection, IDS technology developed specifically for SCADA environments can be deployed with confidence in detecting malicious activity.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional information technology (IT) measures of monitoring and securing Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Control System networks perimeters have used Intrusion Detection System (IDS) appliances or software that examine traffic on the network and wait for events to occur. Current IDSs rely on signatures and anomaly detection to find malicious packets, scanning attempts, and denial-of-service, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. These systems are a good start for securing a SCADA network; however, another degree of granularity is required to understand how the systems operate and how to protect them and the infrastructure they operate. This paper describes common IDS technologies, where they work and where they need to be improved, to cover this new vulnerable SCADA environment.
CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
Two broad type of intrusion detection technology are deployed today: those that detect anomalies in the network and those that match signatures. Anomaly-based IDSs usually fall into three separate categories: behavioral, traffic pattern and protocol [1] . These systems classify network activity as either normal or anomalous and rely heavily on heuristics to make a determination on the traffic's intent. A signature-based IDS can only detect malicious traffic or network misuse if a signature has been explicitly created for detection. Signature-based IDSs rely on a series of patterns that malicious traffic may or may not match. When a signature-or anomaly-based IDS discovers a match or classifies a piece of network traffic as suspicious, alerts are generated and sent to either a central logging facility or logged into a file locally. This approach to securing networks works very well for popular network protocols when used in common IT infrastructure. Malicious operating system attacks, web exploitation, and virus-laden packets are detected easily and quickly with current IDS technology.
Vendors have recognized a gap in the applicability of IDS technology to control system environments, and have started to create additional modules for their products targeted at the common protocols used in SCADA and control system protocols including Modbusg, DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol), and Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) [2] . While these additions represent progress, these IDS products still lack the SCADA protocols found at the innermost networks segments the protocols that make the system function [3] . Handling these protocols presents a larger challenge, as they are proprietary and are often undocumented or ported from insecure serial protocols to an Internet protocol (IP) network stack.
Signature-and anomaly-based IDS An example of a simple SCADA network is shown in Figure 2 , and the corresponding rules are found in Table 1 . Each valid connection, shown in black, has an entry in the IDS that allows the connection to occur without triggering an alarm. The invalid connections, shown in red, will be collected in the default rule that will trigger an alert. In the normal course of operation, a Human Machine Interface (HIMI) or an operator console should have no reason to connect to the front end processor (FEP). In this scenario, such a connection would cause the flow-based IDS to send out an alert. 
